A distributed key generation scheme allows the key servers to distributively share a secret key and then compute the corresponding public key. Canny and Sorkin (Canny and Sorkin, 2004) proposed a probabilistic threshold distributed key generation scheme that is suitable for the case that the number of key servers is large.
INTRODUCTION
The security of a cryptographic scheme usually relies on protecting a secret key. One way to protect such a key is to distribute it to a set of key servers such that each key server holds a key share. Key sharing not only enhances key protection, but also provides a robustness property for the secret key. For example, in a threshold key sharing scheme, a set of key servers over a threshold number can recover the secret key. Even though some servers do not work, the system works.
A distributed key generation scheme allows the key servers to distributively share a secret key and then compute the corresponding public key. In this paper we focus on discrete logarithm-based threshold distributed key generation schemes, in which the secret key is x and the public key is y = g x mod p. Almost all threshold distributed key generation schemes use secret sharing schemes as building blocks. Each key server runs a secret sharing scheme to share its chosen secret to other key servers.
Shamir (Shamir, 1979) proposed the first threshold secret sharing scheme based on polynomial interpolation. Feldman (Feldman, 1987) added verification of secret shares (verifiable secret sharing, VSS) to Shamir's scheme. Pedersen (Pedersen, 1991a) further improved the scheme by making the secret shares unconditionally secure.
Based on his verifiable secret sharing scheme, Pedersen (Pedersen, 1991b) proposed a threshold distributed key generation scheme with some important properties that a threshold distributed key generation scheme should have. Gennaro et al. (Gennaro et al., 1999) found that an adversary can bias the distribution of the generated secret key by a subtle maneuver. They then gave a formal definition and proposed a secure scheme. Chu and Tzeng (Chu and Tzeng, 2002) further pointed out that dishonest key servers should not obtain valid key shares to avoid abuse. Canny and Sorkin (Canny and Sorkin, 2004) proposed a probabilistic threshold distributed key generation scheme that is suitable for the case that the number n of involved key servers is large, for example, in the level of hundreds or thousands. The main merit of their scheme is that the total number of communications between key servers is greatly reduced from O(n 2 )
to O(nl/ε 2 ), where l and ε are security and robustness parameters, respectively. Nevertheless, it is possible to improve their scheme in some aspects. Since the arrangement of key servers is very regular, the scheme is vulnerable to a large cluster of dishonest key servers. If the DoS attack occurs to block a cluster of honest key servers from connecting to Internet, the execution of the scheme would fail. See Section 2.2 for the details.
In this paper we employ the randomness technique to cope with the problems encountered by Canny and Sorkin's scheme. We assign non-zero values to random entries, while Canny and Sorkin's scheme assigns non-zero values to fixed entries. Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, our scheme is secure against a large cluster of dishonest key servers. Secondly, its performance is better than Canny and Sorkin's method in some aspects. We support this point by a series of simulation experiments. As a result, our scheme and Canny and Sorkin's scheme can be used in different situations.
PRELIMINARY
Let p = 2q+1 be a large prime, where q is also prime. Let G q be the subgroup of quadratic residues in Z * p and g and h be generators of G q . Hereafter, the operations used in exponents of g and h are over Z q . Assume that there are n key servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , and the threshold is t, where t ≤ n ≪ q. A bold character is either a matrix, like E, or a vector, like a i , A probabilistic threshold distributed key generation (PTDKG) scheme consists of three stages: setup, key share establishment and public key computation. A PTDKG scheme should satisfy the following conditions. In condition S1, it is necessary to assume that the adversary randomly picks the controlled key servers. Otherwise, if the adversary chooses the controlled key servers, he can choose those that communicate with the key server S i and gets the secret share of S i . Thus, α should be less than r i /n, where r i is the number of key servers that communicate with S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If we want smaller r i (communication cost), the security threshold is smaller.
Definition 1 An
A typical key share establishment stage consists of two sub-stages: 1. Each key server runs a secret sharing scheme to share its chosen secret to other key severs.
2. Each key server combines the received secret shares to form its key share. In the first sub-stage, dishonest key servers are detected and excluded. In the second sub-stage, the remained honest key servers compute their key shares, which define a unique secret key.
In the following two subsections, we introduce conventional and Canny and Sorkin's approaches for the key share establishment stage.
Conventional Approaches
We first use the matrix representation to explain Shamir's secret sharing scheme. It corresponds to a t × n-dimensional evaluation matrix:
For key share establishment, each key server S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does the following:
The operations are over Z q .
Send s i, j to the key server
4. Exclude dishonest key servers and compute a key share x i from the received s i, j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In the above the verification messages and steps are ignored for simplicity. Let H ⊆ {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } be the set of honest key servers established in the key share establishment stage. Each key server S j in H computes its key share
The secret key defined by the key shares of the key servers in H is
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For A = {S i 1 , S i 2 , . . . , S i r }, let E A be the matrix with the columns i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i r of E. For example, E {S 1 ,S 3 ,S 4 } is a t × 3-dimensional matrix that has columns 1, 3 and 4 of E. A set T of key servers from H can recover the secret key x if and only if E T has the full rank, i.e., rank(E T ) = t. We can solve x by selecting t independent columns E T ′ from E T , T ′ ⊆ T , and compute
Since any t rows of E form a Vandermonde matrix, these rows are independent and any t key servers can recover the secret key x, which is the first entry of ∑ i∈H a i . Any set of less than t key servers cannot compute the secret key x. Thus, the above defines a ((t − 1)/n,t/n, 0)-PTDKG scheme. One disadvantage of the above method is that each key server S i has to communicate with each other key server. The total number of communications between the key servers is O(n 2 ), which shall entail heavy network overhead when n is large.
Distributed key generation schemes based on Feldman's and Pedersen's verifiable secret sharing schemes are similar except that the received shares of each key server are verifiable (Feldman, 1987; Pedersen, 1991b ).
Canny and Sorkin's Approach
The idea of Canny and Sorkin to reduce the communication cost is to make s i very sparse by choosing an appropriate E. For a zero entry s i, j , the key server S i need not send s i, j to the key server S j . By this, the communication cost from S i to S j is saved. If s i is very sparse, the communication cost from S i to other key servers S j is much reduced.
Let E be a t × n-dimensional evaluation matrix with a band of non-zero entries as follows, where ⋆ means a random number in Z q , which is non-zero overwhelmingly:
Let l be the width of the band and f be the offset of the band between two consecutive rows. For example, the above band matrix has l = 4 and f = 2. In the scheme, a dealer chooses E and publishes it. Each key sever S i chooses a t-dimensional block vector
where j is a pre-determined index and k is the block width. The vector s i = a i E has only (k − 1) f + l nonzero entries. The key server S i need send non-zero share s i, j to the key servers S j . With fixed t and n, we can make (k − 1) f + l small by tuning parameters k, l and f . Canny and Sorkin's PTDKG (called CS-PTDKG hereafter) scheme is (1/ f − ε, 1/ f + ε, δ), for some small ε and δ, 0 < ε, δ < 1. Overall, their method needs n((k −1) f +l)) node-to-node communications, while most previous methods need n(n − 1) node-tonode communications. They suggest that l = O(log n) and k = l/(2ε 2 ). This saves quite a lot of communications between key servers overall when n is large.
We note that E and a i is very regular and this regularity makes the system vulnerable to burst interruption. For example, if a burst interruption keeps l consecutive key servers from participating the scheme, the scheme does not work even though the number n − l of alive key servers is much larger than βn = (1/ f + ε)n.
OUR CONSTRUCTION
We employ the randomness technique to cope with the problem of burst interruption. We choose E and a i randomly such that it is more robust against burst interruption. To see this, if l consecutive key servers cannot participate, the rest key servers can compute the secret key with high probability.
For each row of E, we randomly choose l entries and assign random values in Z q to them. For example, the following E has t = 3, n = 5, and l = 2:
Each key server S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, randomly chooses k entries of a i and assigns random values in Z q to them. We see that s i = a i E has kl non-zero entries at most. Although the number of non-zero entries is more than (k − 1) f + l in the CS-PTDKG scheme if k and l are the same. We shall show that our system needs smaller k and l to achieve the same level of robustness in simulation. Before presenting our scheme, we need to discuss some theoretical problems concerning the feasibility of our construction. The framework is to consider the probability that E ′ , which is obtained from E by deleting some columns randomly, has the full rank. If rank(E ′ ) = t, the key shares of honest key servers define the secret key uniquely.
First, the following are some terminologies about graphs. Let U and V be two sets of vertices. A graph G = (U,V, E) is bipartite if the edge set E ⊆ U × V , that is, the vertices in U (and V ) are not connected. A bipartite graph G = (U,V, E) is left l-regular if all vertices in U have degree l. A perfect matching for a bipartite graph G = (U,V, E) with |U| ≤ |V | is a set of edges M ⊆ E with |M| = |U| such that every vertex x ∈ U is incident to one edge in M and every vertex y ∈ V is incident to at most edge in M.
We consider E as the matrix representation of a bipartite graph G = (U,V, E), where each row is a vertex in U, each column is a vertex in V and (u, v) ∈ E if the (u, v)-entry of E is non-zero. Thus, |U| = t and |V | = n. For example, the bipartite graph corresponding to the matrix in Equation (2) It is left l-regular since every vertex u ∈ U has degree l. We see that M = {(u 1 , v 5 ), (u 2 , v 1 ), (u 3 , v 2 )} is a perfect matching for the graph.
The property of the full rank of E is related to perfect matching of G = (U,V, E), |U| ≤ |V |. Assume that M ⊆ E is a perfect matching of G. We can use the matching edge (u, v) ∈ M as the pivot entry (u, v) of E to eliminate non-zero entries in column v. Furthermore, since the values in non-zero entries are randomly selected from a very large set Z q , it is very unlikely that the elimination process by a pivot would cause another pivot to be zero. Therefore, the t columns associated with the perfect matching M are independent. We would say that E has the full rank t if and only if G has a perfect matching. The criteria for a bipartite graph to have a perfect matching is known as Hall's lemma.
Lemma 1 (Hall) A bipartite graph G = (U,V, E) has a perfect matching from U to V if and only if for every subset S ⊆ U, |Γ(S)| ≥ |S|, where Γ(S) is the set of S's neighbor vertices in V .
We show that the probability that a random left lregular bipartite graph has a perfect matching is close to 1. In the following two theorems, we allow multiple edges in bipartite graphs for a simpler analysis. If no multiple edges are allowed, which is like our construction, the probability of forming a perfect matching is higher. This means that our construction is better than the analyzed one.
Theorem 1 For appropriate positive integers t, l and n such that, for
The probability that a random left l-regular bipartite graph G = (U,V, E) has a perfect matching is 1 − t 3 2 ( 1 n ) 2l−1 at least , where |U| = t, |V | = n and t ≤ n.
Proof 1 We compute the probability that the condition in Hall's lemma is not satisfied. For a subset S ⊆ U of j vertices and a subset T ⊆ V of j − 1 vertices, the probability that all edges from S hit into the set T is
( j − 1 n ) jl .
The probability that there is a subset S ⊆ U of j vertices whose edges hit within a subset of fewer than j vertices of V is at most
p j = t j n j − 1 ( j − 1 n ) jl . Since, for 3 ≤ j ≤ t, p j−1 /p j = j( j − 1) (t − j + 1)(n − j + 2) ( j − 2 j − 1 ) ( j−1)l ( n j − 1 ) l ≥ 1,
the probability that a left l-regular random bipartite graph does not satisfy Hall's lemma is at most
t ∑ j=2 p j ≤ (t − 1)p 2 = t(t − 1) 2 2 ( 1 n ) 2l−1 < t 3 2 ( 1 n ) 2l−1 .
Thus, the theorem holds.
We notice that the probability can be made arbitrarily small even with rather small l since l is in the exponent of 1/n and n is large. Now, we consider the recoverability of the secret key after the key share establishment stage. After dishonest and unavailable key servers are discarded, a set H of honest key servers is formed. The secret key is computed from the key shares of the key servers in H. The key servers in H can recover the secret key if and only if E H has the full rank t, as explained in Equation (1). Assume that H is randomly selected from {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }. The probability that E H has the full rank depends on the size of H. We show that as long as H is not too small, the probability is close to 1.
Let V ′ (that is, the set H of honest key servers) be a subset of V by randomly deleting m vertices from V . Then, the bipartite graphy G ′ = (U,V ′ , E| U∪V ′ ) has a perfect matching with an overwhelming probability with proper parameters, where E| U∪V ′ is the set of edges incident to vertices in U ∪V ′ .
Theorem 2 For appropriate positive intgers t, l, m and n such that, for
Let G = (U,V, E) be a left l-regular random bipartitate graph. After deteting random m vertices from V , the probability that the remainded bipartite graph has a perfect matching is 1 − (n − m) 
Thus, the probability that there is a subset of S ⊆ U of j vertices whose edges hit a subset of fewer than j
which is an upper bound for the proability that Hall's lemma fails.
Our Distributed Key Generation Scheme
The structure of our scheme is based on Gennaro et al.'s study on secure distributed key generation (Gennaro et al., 1999) . Their scheme is secure against the attack of skewing the secret key distribution by dishonest key servers. Note that the key shares of their scheme are unconditionally secure. At beginning, a dealer chooses a t ×n-dimensional evaluation matrix E and publishes it in a public bulletin board. Our distributed key generation scheme is as follows:
Setup:
A dealer does:
(a) Select a large prime p = 2q + 1, where q is also prime. (b) Compute generators g and h of G q , where G q = {a 2 | a ∈ Z * p } is the subgroup of quadratic residues of Z * p . (c) Choose a t × n-dimensional evaluation matrix E such that each row has l non-zero entries.
Key share establishment:
1. Each key server S i does the following: 
all the key servers in Q i .
Each key server S j does the following:
(a) Check validity of the received shares, for each
If the check fails for i, S j broadcasts a complaint against S i to the key servers in Q j . (b) If S j is complained by S i , it sends s j,i and s ′ j,i to the key servers in Q j . The other key servers in Q j check validity of s j,i and s ′ j,i by Equation (3). If S j fails the test, it is marked as "dishonest" by the key servers in Q j .
3. Each key server S j builds a set H of honest key servers and sets his key share as
which is the jth entry of (∑ i∈H a i )E. Note that the secret key is
Public-key computation: 
If the check fails, S j broadcasts a compliant against S i and sends s i, j and s ′ i, j to the key servers in Q i .
3. If S i is ever complained, all the key servers in Q i reconstruct a i by solving s i = a i E and compute
4. Then, each key server in H computes the public key as
Secret key recovery: Note that in some situations, we don't need to recover the secret key x to finish a task.
Only each S i computes a partial result from its key share x i .
1. Let T be the set of shown-up key servers in H. If E T is full-ranked, solve ∑ i∈H a i by the system of equations
2. The secret key is x = ∑ i∈H a i · 1.
Analysis
The correctness and security of our scheme is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Assume that n,t, l, and m satisfy the condition in Theorem 2. The scheme in Section 3.1 is a secure (
Proof 3 (Sketch) Correctness follows from the results of Gennaro et al. (Gennaro et al., 1999) almost in the same way.
The bounds β = 1 − m/n and δ = (n − m)(t(t − 1) 2 /2)((m + 1)/n) 2l are from Theorem 2 directly. For 
EXPERIMENTS AND COMPARISON
We first analyze the probability that the full rank is achieved after deleting about a half of key servers. Recall that l is the band of E, f is the offset, and t is the number of rows. The choice of parameters affects the communication cost of the scheme. We discuss the parameters first. For the CS-PTDKG scheme, due to the arrangement of E, the number of rows is fixed to t = (n − l)/ f . On allowing n(1/2 − ε) dishonest key servers (eg., ε = 1/10), Canny and Sorkin suggests f = 2, l = 17 log n and t = (n − 17 log n)/2. Theoretically, the probability of achieving the full rank is O(n −2 ).
For our PTDKG scheme, we shall do some simulation experiments to obtain appropriate l ′ on the condition that the probability of achieving the full rank is the same as that of the CS-PTDKG scheme.
We take n = 1000 and delete about m = 500 dishonest key servers randomly. We consider different offsets ( f = 2, f = 3, and f = 4) for the CS-PTDKG scheme. The results are shown in Figures 1-3 . In each figure, the y-axis indicates the probability of achieving the full rank and the x-axis indicates the number l of non-zero entries in each row of E. The probability is computed by randomly sampling 500 key servers as "dishonest" many times. We summarize the comparison results in Table 1 on 90% of achieving the full rank. From the table, we can see that the number l ′ of non-zero entries in each row of our E is much smaller than that (l) of the CS-PTDKG scheme. Table 1 : Comparison of l with 90% of achieving the full rank. There are n = 1000 key servers and m=500 of them are dishonest. t = 408 t = 318 t = 242 ( f = 2) ( f = 3) ( f = 4) CS-PTDKG l = 185 l = 45 l = 33 Ours l ′ = 14 l ′ = 11 l ′ = 8
Communication cost. The total communication cost of our scheme is k ′ l ′ n and that of the CS-PTDKG scheme is ((k − 1) f + l)n. If we want our scheme to have the same communication cost as that of the CS-PTDKG scheme, we set k ′ = ((k − 1) f + l)/l ′ , the number of non-zero entries in each a i of our scheme. Figure 1: Probability of achieving the full rank for different l, when f = 2.
